The Volokh Conspiracy is quick off the mark:
[Orin Kerr, April 2, 2007 at 11:45am] Trackbacks
Supreme Court Decides "Global Warming" Case: The Supreme Court handed down its decision in the "global warming" case, Massachusetts v. EPA, and it looks like a significant victory for environmental interests. Stevens managed to keep Kennedy on board, so it was a 5-4 ruling that will make the EPA go back and reconsider the petition to regulate greenhouse gases. There were two forceful dissents filed in the case. Chief Justice Roberts dissented on standing, joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Scalia dissented on the merits, joined by Roberts, Thomas, and Alito. I'll let others with more expertise offer commentary on the major issues in the case, but there's one minor side issue that I found somewhat amusing. In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens relies in part on a 1907 case for his view that the presence of a state in litigation alters the standing thresholds. Chief Justice Roberts objects to this in his dissent, and Justice Stevens inserted a footnote in the majority opinion with this response to Roberts:
THE CHIEF JUSTICE accuses the Court of misreading Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 (1907), see post, at 34 (dissenting opinion), and "devis[ing] a new doctrine of state standing," id., at 15. But no less an authority than Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System understands Tennessee Copper as a standing decision. R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart & Wechslers The Federal Courts and the Federal System 290 (5th ed. 2003). Indeed, it devotes an entire section to chronicling the long development of cases permitting States "to litigate as parens patriae to protect quasisovereign interestsi.e., public or governmental interests that concern the state as a whole." Id., at 289.Chief Justice Roberts responds:
The Court seems to think we do not recognize that Tennessee Copper is a case about parens patriae standing, ante, at 17, n. 17, but we have no doubt about that. The point is that nothing in our cases (or Hart & Wechsler) suggests that the prudential requirements for parens patriae standing, see Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F. 3d 192, 199, n. (CADC 2002) (observing that parens patriae is merely a species of prudential standing (internal quotation marks omitted)), can somehow substitute for, or alter the content of, the irreducible constitutional minimum requirements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability under Article III. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Does anyone with the latest edition of Hart & Wechsler handy want to weigh in?